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1. Introduction
Bangladesh implemented a national conditional cash transfer program called the Female
Stipend Program (FSP) in 1993. Conditional cash transfer programs (CCTs) incentivize
investments in human capital by providing cash payments to targeted groups. These programs
are often part of poverty reduction strategies or used as social safety nets for disadvantaged
populations. After Mexico’s Progresa demonstrated success in educational attainments in the
1990s, domestic and international actors encouraged the spread of CCT programs to over 130
developing countries in order to achieve a variety of development indicators. Bangladesh’s
program made remarkable progress, dramatically increasing girls’ enrollment in secondary
school and ending the gender gap in education. It has since reversed the gender gap has and now
girls slightly outperform boys in literacy rates and attendance rates. The Punjab province of
Pakistan implemented a similar program, the Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) in 2004
and successfully increased secondary school enrollment for girls by 10%, but both regionally and
nationally, Pakistan has been unable to achieve gender parity in education.
In this paper, I compare the two programs and argue that Bangladesh’s conditional cash
transfer program was more successful. First, I examine the relevant literature on conditional cash
transfers. In the methodology section, I explain why I chose to examine the programs in Pakistan
and Bangladesh to discern the impact of societal differences on the effectiveness of CCT
programs. The case studies for each country analyzes the program’s origins, designs, and
outcomes, as well as political actors. The comparison section identifies four factors; program
design, differences in the education system, political analysis, and economic changes in
Bangladesh, as possible answers for why it was able to reverse the gender gap. Finally, the paper
will draw upon lessons from Bangladesh’s success, in order to provide recommendations for
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Pakistan. My research suggests reasons why Bangladesh’s program was able to overcome the
gender gap, while Pakistan did not. However, due to the limited availability of data, it is
impossible to conclude which of the factors had greater influence. This paper seeks to contribute
to the literature on Conditional Cash Transfers, which currently lacks analysis of country
similarities or differences contributing to CCT success, as well as studies of South Asian CCTs.
My paper concludes that despite their similarities, including shared history and cultural practices
impacting girls’ education, the conditions in Bangladesh were more ideal for reducing the gender
gap through a CCT program.
2. Literature Review
2.1 Summary of the Literature
While conditional cash transfer programs share some commonalities, domestic
policymakers design each program with conditions, selection methods, and benefit amounts
depending on the context and the program’s goals. The literature on the subject is largely made
up of evaluations of these programs and their ability to impact children’s education and health,
political engagement, and women’s empowerment. In many cases, different CCT programs were
successful at improving attendance and retention in school, use of health services, trust in
government, and household consumption.
The empirical evidence on the effects of Conditional Cash transfers is fairly extensive. It
consists of econometric studies, papers, books, papers containing qualitative evaluations and
surveys of individual programs, and peer-reviewed journal articles. The Overseas Development
Institute, a think-tank in London, provided a broader comprehensive report of several
Conditional Cash transfer programs, and more studies like this would be helpful for observing
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patterns and generalizations among CCT outcomes. Fiszbein’s source published by The World
Bank also provided general conclusions about a variety of CCT programs. The literature is
frequently divided into time periods or “waves,” and predominantly made up of studies of the
first “wave,” which were implemented in the 1990s-2000s. Progresa and La Bolsa Familia in
Mexico and Brazil are usually considered the first wave and subsequent programs, particularly
those outside of Latin America, are referred to as the second wave. In Figure 1, the spread of
CCTs around the world over time is depicted and divides them into waves. Note that in this
publication, Bangladesh is considered part of the first wave. Even though Bangladesh’s CCT,
Female Secondary School Stipend Programme, occurred during the first wave, it has attracted
relatively less scholarly attention compared to Progresa and La Bolsa Familia. This is a
noticeable trend in the literature. CCTs from the second wave and from non-Latin American
countries are more likely to be shorter papers, and very few books have been published on them.
Meanwhile, entire books have been written on just Latin American CCTs or even just on
Progresa. Research on the more recent and second wave of CCTs and CCTs in developing
countries outside of Latin America are currently underrepresented in the literature and should be
further explored. The distribution and density of CCT programs worldwide is shown in Figure 1,
making it clear that a significant number of studies used in the Overseas Development Institute
report were from Latin America.1

“Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review of Programme Impact and of the Role of
Design and Implementation Features.” Overseas Development Institute (ODI), July 2016.
1
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2.2 Context
International context is an important factor in understanding why CCTs became widely
introduced and studied. In the 1980s, the global economy experienced a downturn and many
countries initiated neoliberal reforms and reductions in government spending to alleviate the
crises.2 This led to increased pressure from international financial institutions for “efficiency” in
social spending and a reduction of social protection programs.3 Towards the end of the 1990s,
international financial institutions became more interested in poverty reduction, and required
lending governments to produce Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) to encourage

2

Michelle Adato And John Hoddinott, Eds., Conditional Cash Transfers In Latin America (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2010).
3
Ibid.
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countries to manage their debt and as CCTs spread, they were often part of these PRSPs.4
Gender also came into focus in development policy world around this time. An international
consensus was reached at the 1995 at fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing that
women faced a “persistent and increasing burden of poverty,” and afterwards it was widely
published that women made up 70% of the world’s poor.5 Governments began “mainstreaming”
gender into their Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSP) papers and academics around the world
began exploring the concept of “gendered poverty.”6 This international context played an
important role in the spread of female-focused microcredit schemes, CCTs, and other genderfocused development strategies that sought to reduce gender inequality and poverty. Girl’s
education is often chosen as a “safe,” non-controversial, and attainable first step towards
empowerment, and thus donors and international agencies like the World Bank have actively
encouraged and funded female education in the Global South.7 Additionally, the Millennium
Development Goals launched in September 2000 placed pressure on countries to conform to
specific and categorized human development indicators including health, education, women’s
empowerment, and maternal and child mortality rates. These goals and indicators were
frequently used in the design of CCTs and in their evaluations.
Individual cash transfer programs can be designed for a number of reasons by various
actors with their own agendas, but they share similar international context, and most can trace
their origins to Mexico’s Progresa program. From 1994-1995, Mexico experienced an economic

Sarah Bradshaw And Brian Linneker, “Poverty Alleviation In A Changing Policy And Political Context: The Case
Of Prsps With Particular Reference To Nicaragua,” In The International Handbook Of Gender And Poverty
(Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, 2010), 1-25.
5
Ibid., 9-12.
6
Ibid., 10-13.
7
Elora Shehabuddin, Reshaping the Holy: Democracy, Development, and Muslim Women in Bangladesh (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2008), 133.
4
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crisis, and the new administration under Ernesto Zedillo decided to phase out food subsidy
programs and instead provide cash grants to poor families under conditions.8 The Programa de
Educacion, Salud, y Alimentacion, or Progresa, provided monetary transfers to female heads of
house in exchange for children’s regular attendance at school from the third years of primary and
secondary school and regular health center visits.9 Progresa encouraged parents to send their
children to school, and the cash payments were supposed to make up the opportunity cost of
children’s time in school that they could have spent earning income for the family.10 Affirmative
action was present in the program design; girl students received a 10% higher stipend than
boys.11 Making the cash transfers to female heads of house was a calculated decision in the
Progresa program that became replicated in many of the following programs in other countries.
The rationale behind this design choice is that women are more responsible than men in
household management and children’s needs.12 In poor households, some theorized that
household income tended to be skewed towards men’s consumption, leaving women and
children in “secondary poverty,” and that expenditure by women would be better directed
towards household needs. 13 The program saw an increase of 9% points for girl’s enrollment in
secondary school and 5-6% points for boys.14 There was significant reduction in grade repetition
and dropout rates, as well as increases in progression rates in both primary and secondary
school.15 Long-run estimated years of schooling increased across age groups when compared to

8

Adato and Hoddinott, 191-210.
Alain de Janvry and Elisabeth Sadoulet, “Making Conditional Cash Transfer Programs More Efficient: Designing
for Maximum Effect of the Conditionality,” The World Bank Economic Review 20, no. 1 (January 1, 2006): 1–29.
10
Ibid.,
11
Maxine Molyneux, “Mothers At The Service Of The New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s
Conditional Transfer Programme,” 425–49.
12
Ibid., 425–49.
13
Ibid., 425–49.
14
Adato and Hoddinott, 191-210.
15
Ibid., 191-210.
9
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pre-program.16 Progresa also led to 18.2% more visits to clinics compared to areas where no
program occurred.17 Progresa’s impacts were measured by sampling families and surveying
them for a year before and after the program started, as well as in the following months. 18 The
program reached over 300,000 households, 344 localities, 12 states, and had a budget of around
$60 million US dollars.19 When it was remodeled into Oportunidades, it reached all states and
had a budget of $3 billion.20 The success of Progresa contributed to the international culture of
poverty reduction through CCTs and similar programs, and there is evidence that The World
Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank encouraged the project and its replication in
other countries.21
2.3 Design
Most of the sources reached a consensus that design was the most important factor of a
successful CCT program. Policymakers must consider the individual country and its context and
goals, and the literature was critical of international pressure to adopt CCTs, warning that the
programs had to be designed for the country and not simply replicated. When designing CCT
programs, the costs and risks associated with targeting and conditions must be kept in mind.
Well-calibrated targeting incurs high administrative costs, while poorly targeted programs run
the risk of mismanagement or exclusion.22 Successful targeting also relies on extensive
information collection and can include single national registries and ID cards.23 For example,

16

Ibid., 191-210.
Ibid., 214
18
de Janvry and Sadoulet, 1–29.
19
Adato and Hoddinott,, 1-5.
20
Ibid. 1-5.
21
Ibid., 1-5.
22
Francesca Bastagli, “Conditional Cash Transfers as a Tool of Social Policy.” Economic and Political Weekly 46,
no. 21 (2011): 61–66.
23
Ibid., 61–66.
17
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targeting mechanisms in Latin America are determined using a proxy means test, requiring the
collection of information to rank potential beneficiaries and create a welfare score.24 The
literature also covered the conditional aspect of the programs. Conditionality requires
compliance by the beneficiaries and follow-through verification of that compliance. Conditions
have to be balanced with the program goals in mind as well as the ability of the targeted
population to achieve those goals. Conditions that are too stringent can place disproportionate
burdens on families, misperceptions of the purpose of the programs, and other unintended
effects.25 Conditional cash transfer programs are expensive to implement and there was pressure
to avoid inefficiency in design, particularly in targeting and conditions, to provide measurable
improvements in program goals.
2.4 Outcomes
In terms of human capital, the most consistent improvement CCTs across all the literature
had to do with use of services, such as increased enrollment and use of health services. CCTs
improved quantitative indicators for children’s education and health. The Overseas Development
Institute found that a majority of the CCT consistently increased school attendance and reduced
absences.26 However, CCTs in general did not appear to positively influence test scores. Cash
transfers can increase indicators like school attendance but not necessarily “improved learning
outcomes.”27 This makes sense when one examines the rationale behind CCTs; providing cash
incentives acts as a demand side policy. The supply side is where many of the indicators fell
short, because increasing demand for services using CCTs are only as helpful as the quality of

24

Ibid., 61–66.
Ibid., 61–66.
26
“Cash Transfers: What Does the Evidence Say? A Rigorous Review of Programme Impact and of the Role of
Design and Implementation Features.” Overseas Development Institute (ODI), July 2016.
27
Ibid.
25
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care provided. If schools or health facilities are understaffed, underfunded, poorly managed, or
are prejudiced against minority groups, then the effectiveness of CCTs were drastically reduced.
As a result, many authors recommended that supply side improvements in health and education
should be implemented alongside CCTs to maximize effectiveness.
The literature also makes it clear that while CCTs can be used as a tool of poverty reduction,
they cannot singlehandedly correct multi-generation poverty. That is why some authors, like
Kapur, Mukhopadhyay, and Subramanian, recommend viewing CCTs more like social safety
nets or welfare schemes to provide income to households “to cross the poverty threshold,” rather
than as aiming to achieve specific economic development goals.28 These authors argue that
without economic or state reform, anti-poverty schemes like CCTs are simply an improvement
“over the status quo by helping to improve access of the poor to goods and services.”29
In addition to the gap in the literature about CCTs in South Asia, many of the comprehensive
reports, like ODI and the World Bank Report, lacked analysis on how political, economic, and
bureaucratic differences might affect outcomes. In the impact reports, there was evidence that
developing countries and their political leadership had an impact on programs according to their
own agendas as well as economic and cultural pressures. Morais de Sa e Silva notes that the
political implications for CCTs are unique; the programs are very adjustable to incoming parties
and their priorities, and yet, the programs do not have any sort of constitutional guarantee.30 For
example, Mexico’s CCT program Progresa became much more conservative after the center

Devesh Kapur, Partha Mukhopadhyay, And Arvind Subramanian, “More On Direct Cash Transfers,” Economic
And Political Weekly 43, No. 47 (2008): 85–87.
29
Ibid., 85–87.
30
Michelle Morais De Sa E Silva, Poverty Reduction, Education, And The Global Diffusion Of Conditional Cash
Transfers (New York, Ny: Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2017).
28
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right Fox administration remodeled it into Oportunidades.31 In Nicaragua, the Red de Proteccion
Social CCT program began as a way to combat the economic crisis created by the falling coffee
prices in the early 2000s, but was eventually adapted due to pressure from international financial
institutions, changes in government, and other factors.32 Bradshaw suggests that the Catholic
Church’s influence made the early program more about family values and emphasized women’s
role as mothers.33 All of these case studies that analyzed political context were in Latin America.
While country specific impact reports would provide detailed information on the programs,
countries and their context, information about political and economic context was much less
present when comparing CCTs in broader evaluations of CCTs like The World Bank Report or
the ODI report. Additionally, while it was acknowledged that girls’ education faced similar
barriers across developing countries, such as income, it was unclear if similar cultural attitudes
about girls’ education or other similarities between countries would have an impact on the
program’s success. My research, therefore, sought to contribute to two gaps in the literature; as
lack of studies on South Asian CCTs and whether similarities or differences between countries
contributed to CCT success.
3. Methodology
In order to compare Bangladesh’s FSP and Pakistan’s FSSS, I decided to compile two
detailed case studies of each program and its origins, design, outcomes, and analysis of political
actors. In writing these case studies, I used government and IGO websites and peer reviewed
journals to describe and analyze the programs and their outcomes. I examined impact reports that

Maxine Molyneux, “Mothers At The Service Of The New Poverty Agenda: Progresa/Oportunidades, Mexico’s
Conditional Transfer Programme,” Social Policy And Administration 40, No. 4 (August 2006): 425–49.
32
Shahrashoub Razavi, The Gendered Impacts Of Liberalization: Towards “Embedded Liberalism”? (London:
Routledge, 2011).
33
Sarah Bradshaw And Brian Linneker, “Poverty Alleviation In A Changing Policy And Political Context: The Case
Of Prsps With Particular Reference To Nicaragua.
31
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had been sponsored by a variety of NGOs and international financial institutions, including the
World Bank. I used data from the World Bank and UNICEF to compare development indicators
and statistics between South Asian countries. I also examined newspaper articles from
Bangladesh and Pakistan, in order to gauge opinions and news about the stipend programs and
girls’ education in the media. Comparisons of the conditional cash transfer programs of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan and the People’s Republic of Bangladesh were ideal for a number
of reasons. Research on the more recent and second wave of CCTs and CCTs in developing
countries outside of Latin America are currently underrepresented in the literature, which made
the programs in Bangladesh and Pakistan appropriate for further study.
Additionally, comparisons between these programs and two countries are useful because
Pakistan and Bangladesh share some significant historical, economic, and social context. Both
countries are part of the Indian sub-continent. As former British colonies, news sources and
papers on Pakistan and Bangladesh are more widely available in English, making them easier to
research. They were formerly known as West and East Pakistan respectively until Bangladesh
gained its independence in 1971.34 Pakistan and Bangladesh are also ideal for comparison in
terms of human and economic development. In 2017, they had a similar GDP per capita in USD,
with Pakistan at $1, 547 and Bangladesh at $1, 516 (World Bank).35 They also share the Medium
Human Development Rank category. There are also a few differences worth mentioning as well.
Bangladesh is more ethnically homogenous than Pakistan. Around 98% of the country are
Bengali and speak Bengali, the national language, while Pakistan is made up of many ethnic
groups and languages.36 Both countries are parliamentary republics, but Pakistan is a federal

34

The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
World Bank National Accounts Data and OECD National Accounts Data Files, The World Bank Group, 2018.
https://data.worldbank.org/.
36
The World Factbook 2013-14. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
35
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parliamentary republic.37 Pakistan is larger and has a population of about 207,862,518, while
Bangladesh has 159,453,001.38
Another important factor is that they are both majority Muslim-populated South Asian
countries and are highly influenced by Islamic values and practices. The state religion of
Pakistan is Islam, and 96.4% of the population identifies as Muslim, while 89.1% of the
population of Bangladesh identifies as Muslim.39 This makes them even more ideal for
comparison, as they have a similar source of patriarchal cultural practices that have been justified
by religion. Being South Asian countries, they also share in the cultural practice of purdah,
meaning “curtain,” which refers to the systematic seclusion of women to the home and private
life.40 The purdah limits interactions between men and women, enforcing standards on female
modesty, and is practiced by both Muslims and Hindus in South Asia.41 The extent of purdah as
a practice varies with an individual’s class, region, and religious practices. It can involve the
covering of the entire body and can create a division of labor that restrict women to domestic
duties and force them to rely on men for access to goods and services outside the home. The
purdah has a significant impact on girls’ education in both countries. It can restrict mobility and
women’s access to public space, which can prevent them from receiving an education in the first
place. Even if some parents are willing to send their daughters to school and college, they may
‘insist on some degree of purdah observance … [or] will usually not send them unless the
teachers as well as the principal of the all-girls school are women.”42 This cultural practice

37

Ibid.
Ibid.
39
The World Factbook.
40
Hanna Papanek, “Purdah: Separate Worlds and Symbolic Shelter,” Comparative Studies in Society and History
15, no. 3 (1973): 290.
41
Ibid, 290.
42
Ibid, 311.
38
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necessitates explicit attention and funding of girls’ education, to meet the cultural practices of
purdah when parents are willing to educate their daughters. In the literature, authors caution
about replicating CCTs exactly, as programs should take into account the unique context of the
country. Cultural and political differences would certainly play a role in the success of the
program, even if the countries share similar patriarchal values and norms like the purdah.
The programs themselves were ideal for comparison, because they had the same target
population, girls in secondary school. It is worth noting that in Bangladesh, secondary school
refers to grades six through 10, with no concept of middle school, while in Pakistan, middle
school consists of grades six through eight, and secondary school refers to grades nine through
ten. Both programs are referred to as secondary school stipend programs, and both target girls in
these grade categories, so throughout the paper, secondary school will refer to grades six through
ten, for both countries.
4. Case Study: Bangladesh
4.1 Introduction
The national Female Stipend Program in Bangladesh played an important role in
dramatically increasing girls’ enrollment in secondary school and ending the gender gap in
education. In 1990, the gross national secondary school enrollment for girls was 13.67%,
compared to 26.8% for boys.43 In 2016, gross national secondary school enrollment was 72.49%
for girls and 65.61% for boys.44 Other positive short and long-term impacts among stipend
participants were also observed. Bangladesh’s achievements in gender parity in education
prompted the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender Gap Report to claim that Bangladesh

“World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files,” The World Bank Group, 2018.
https://data.worldbank.org/. Gross enrollment ratio is the ratio of total enrollment, regardless of age, to the
population of the age group that corresponds to the level of education.
44
Ibid.
43
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was “leading South Asia in terms of gender equality” in 2017.45 However, while the program
improved select indicators, problematic trends and program design aspects were also detected.
The female secondary school stipend required coordination between the government, nongovernment organizations, and international donors, and the program’s outcomes revealed
tensions between these actors. This case study will cover the program’s origins, design, and
outcomes, in order to analyze the program’s successes and shortcomings.
4.2 Origins
In 1982, the Bangladesh Association for Community Education (BACE), a national nongovernmental organization (NGO), began the Female Secondary School Stipend Project (FSP) in
the Shahrasti and Kaharole upazilas, with financial support from USAID and the Asia
Foundation. 46 In 1992, NORAD, the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation, assumed
funding responsibilities, and coverage was increased to seven upazilas.47 The project was scaled
up to a national program in 1993 with increased technical and financial support from
international actors.48 BACE was founded by Dr. M.A. Sattar in 1977 in order to promote
education by achieving universal primary education, “reducing dropouts of students from
primary and secondary school level, educating unemployed youth, and promoting educational
levels specifically for women.”49 The term NGO refers to organizations outside of government
control that are engaged in providing financial or non-financial services to a community.50 NGOs
are accountable to their donors, who are motivated to fund these services when they perceive that

45

World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report: 2017 (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2017).
Ibid; Upazilas are the administrative regions of Bangladesh, of which there are 492.
47
Ibid.
48
Anna T Schurmann, “Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Project Using a Social
Exclusion Framework,” Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition 27, no. 4 (August 2009): 505–517.
49
“Bangladesh Association for Community Education (BACE).” www.bd-directory.com, 2014. http://www.bddirectory.com/Bangladesh_Association_for_Community_Education.html.
50
Sajjad Zohir, “NGO Sector in Bangladesh: An Overview,” Economic and Political Weekly Vol. 39, No. 36 (Sep.
4-10, 2004), pp. 4109-4113.
46
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governments have failed to do so.51 NGOs in Bangladesh must be registered to maintain their
not-for-profit status, and BACE has been “registered with the Registrar of Joint Stock
Companies since 1978, and also registered with the Social Welfare Department of the
Government of Bangladesh since March 22, 2010.”52
In 2000, Bangladesh committed to the Millennium Development Goals, which included
Goal 2: Achieve Universal Primary Education.53 This goal sought to ensure that, “by 2015,
children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to complete a full course of primary
schooling.”54 The Bangladeshi government made primary education (grades 1-5) compulsory
and free in 1990.55 In both primary and secondary schooling, a gender gap was observable (see
Figure 2). In particular, girls at that time were very rarely progressing to secondary school.
Figure 2: Gross Enrollment in 1990
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World
Bank Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/

Girls
Boys

Primary School
73.86%
87.64%

Secondary School
13.67%
26.8% s

As young girls in Bangladesh reach adolescence, cultural factors and income become
significant barriers to their education. While current legislation prohibits child marriage, it has
been a pervasive practice due to cultural norms or financial burdens on families.56 Violence
against women in Bangladesh is also highly prevalent, taking the form of acid attacks, stalking,

51

Ibid., 4109
Ibid., 4110.
53
UNICEF Bangladesh, “A perspective on gender equality in Bangladesh, From young girl to adolescent: What is
lost in Transition? Analysis based on selected results of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey 2009,” 2011.
ttps://www.unicef.org/bangladesh/Gender_paper_Final_2011_Low.pdf.
54
Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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‘eve teasing,’ and sexual assault. These two factors, marriage and safety, are serious deterrents
on decisions to educate daughters.
In addition to these social pressures for girls to drop out, secondary schools across
Bangladesh were not free at the time, and compulsory and free primary school only covered
grades 1-5. Although the government tended to provide 80% or so of teacher salaries through
subventions and provides accreditation, 95% of the secondary schools were privately run,
charged tuition, and were managed by a community-based School Management Committees
(SMC) “with broad local power over school affairs, including over the hiring and dismissal of
teachers.”57 This tuition and additional costs of uniforms, books, examination fees provided an
additional deterrent to educating girls. Studies have shown that impoverished households are
even less likely to send girls to school compared to their male siblings.58 Girls provide more
“child labor inputs to the household’s economic activities and domestic chores,” and thus poor
households are more likely to rely on girls’ labor.59 Females may also enroll in school but be
forced to drop out for any of these factors. Due to this direct relationship between parental
income and girl’s enrollment in school, conditional cash transfers have become a popular
development strategy because they ease the financial deterrents associated with girls’ education
and incentivize investments in girls’ education. The Female Stipend Program was introduced to
tackle these challenges in maintaining girl’s education after adolescence.

Simeen Mahmud, “Female Secondary School Stipend Programme in Bangladesh: A Critical Assessment.”
UNESCO: EFA Global Monitoring Report 2003/4, The Leap to Equality. Bangladesh Institute of Development
Studies, 2004, 67-92.
58
Ibid., 67-92.
59
Ibid., 67-92.
57
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4.3 Program Design
The goal of the program was to increase girls’ enrollment and retain them in secondary
education, assist them in passing the SSC examination to enhance their employment
opportunities, and delay age of marriage.60 The program provided payment of the girl’s tuition
fees and a monthly stipend and was conditional on 75% attendance of the school year, at least
45% marks on exams, and remaining unmarried.61 These conditions were chosen in order to
make up the cost of sending girls to school, improve quality by “putting pressure for good
performance,” and delay girls’ marriage “to achieve social and demographic goals.”62 It was
hoped that these conditions would create long-term contributions to gender equity in
Bangladesh.63To be eligible for the program, female students had to be enrolled in recognized
institutions in rural upazilas where the program was taking place.64
Stipends were awarded to the girls directly. Participants opened and learned how to
operate an account in upazila branches of a nationalized bank.65 Additionally, if a bank was more
than 5 kilometers from the school, “temporary booths” were set up at the school to allow girls to
withdraw the stipend money.66 This system, according to Mahmud, “empowered” girls by giving
them agency over their own finances and minimized leakages by keeping school authorities out
of the process.67 The program recipients received the stipend through bank accounts in two
installments, and the amount increased with grade level, as shown below.68
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Figure 3: Rates of stipend and tuition per month in Taka
Source: Simeen Mahmud, “Female Secondary School Stipend Programme in Bangladesh: A Critical
Assessment.”

Grade

Stipend

Tuition

Book
Allowance

SSC Exam
Fee

Government
Non-gov.
6
25
10
15
7
30
12
15
8
35
12
15
9
60
15
20
250
10
60
15
20
500
By 2004, the program covered 460 of the some 492 upazilas in Bangladesh. The number of
participants fluctuated with changes to the program’s targeting during renewals, but at the
program’s height, over 4 million girls were receiving the stipend (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Number of Girls Receiving Stipends, 1999-2005
Source: Schurmann, Anna T, “Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School
Stipend Project Using a Social Exclusion Framework,” Journal of Health, Population, and
Nutrition 27, no. 4 (August 2009): 505–17.

Year
Number of Girls receiving stipends
1999
3, 564, 404
2000
3, 961, 194
2001
4, 191, 058
2002
4, 193, 352
2003
3, 467, 123
2004
2, 356, 856
2005
2, 270, 343
The national program was launched in 1993 and received increased technical and
financial support from international actors, including NORAD, the World Bank, the government
of Bangladesh, and the Asian Development Bank. 69 Each program and its corresponding
organization covered specific upazilas; for example, SESIP was run by ADB. Control of the
program within the government shifted throughout the years; it began as a pilot program under
the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare and was later scaled up to a national program and
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taken over by the Ministry of Education.70 Figures 5 and 6 depicts the financial breakdown of the
program between the Bangladeshi government and international actors. The government incurred
most of the program’s costs, and the program made up a significant amount of the education
budget (Figure 5). Total government expenditure on education remained mostly the same,
hovering around 2% (Figure 5). All four programs (FSSAP, FSSAP funded by NORAD, FESP,
SESIP) within the national program were renewed for a five-year period after 2004, with more
components to improve quality of education.71
Figure 5: Funding Breakdown of National Stipend Program, 2004
Source: Simeen Mahmud, “Female Secondary School Stipend Programme in Bangladesh: A Critical
Assessment.”
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Figure 6: Cost to the Government of Bangladesh, 1997-2000
Source: Schurmann, Anna T, “Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Project Using a
Social Exclusion Framework,” Journal of Health, Population, and Nutrition 27, no. 4 (August 2009): 505–17.
and https://data.worldbank.org/
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takas
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Education Development
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Government expenditure on
education, total (% of GDP)

1997
2.2

1998
3.7

1999
4.0

2000
3.9

15.0 %

17.7%

16.5%

15.7%

1.952%

n/a

2.133%

2.1%

4.4 Outcomes
In terms of increasing enrollment of girls in secondary school, the program appears to
have been very successful. After the program began in 1993, female enrollment at the secondary
level doubled between 1990 and 1997 to nearly 3 million girls.73 These results are significant
when considering the statistics before the program. In 1991, only 20% of women in Bangladesh
were literate, and in secondary school, only 33% of enrolled students and 29% of graduates were
girls.74 In 2013, the literacy rate for girls ages 15-24 years is around 80%, and secondary school
enrollment rate for girls reached around 50%.75
It is difficult to isolate the stipend program from other education programs and reforms
taking place at that time. Conditional cash transfers, which address the demand side, have
historically been more effective alongside supply-side reforms. In Bangladesh, the female
stipend program occurred alongside supply side improvements such as facilities development,
teacher training and curriculum development, capacity building for academic supervision, and
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institutional development for monitoring and evaluation.76 Additionally, similar programs,
including Food for Education program (FFE) took place in 1993 and “incentivized primary
school attendance for targeted vulnerable households by providing wheat and flour, conditional
on school attendance.”77 That is why impact assessments were conducted by different social
scientists and organizations attempting to isolate the stipend’s impact on secondary school
enrollment for girls. Impact assessments would attempt to isolate the impacts of the program by
comparing to girls of the same age in urban areas who were ineligible for the program.78 In the
process, these impact assessments revealed a variety of short and long-term outcomes on
participants.
According to Mahmud, impact assessments revealed positive impacts such as increased
“age at marriage, greater birth spacing, positive attitude to smaller family size, and higher
employment and earning levels.”79 Additionally, the program appeared to improve some
“attitudes among community leaders and the general population towards female secondary
education.”80 Studies of the female stipend program also revealed that “older siblings’ education
has a significant, and large, impact on younger siblings’ education.”81 It was estimated that for
each “additional year of schooling undertaken by older siblings, the number of years of
schooling completed by younger siblings increases by about 0.13 years.”82 A study by
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Shamsuddin found that exposure to five years of the program led to “one year increase in
education level completed and an increase in female labor force participation by six percentage
points.”83 A study by Hahn et. all confirmed that “short-term decline in fertility from remaining
in school” was sustained in the long-term.84 Participants were “more likely to work in the formal
sector and less likely in the agricultural or informal sector” and “married more educated
husbands who had a better occupation and who were closer in age to their own age.”85
Additionally, the study found that “the children of eligible women were taller and heavier for
their age, suggesting that the stipend generated positive intergenerational health effects.”86
It has also been debated to what extent achieving educational indicators like enrollment
can be considered a sign of education attainment. This is a recurring argument in the literature
surrounding Conditional Cash Transfer programs in general. The Female Stipend Program and
its goals and outcomes have been criticized for focusing on meeting quotas and numbers rather
than educational or rights-based outcomes.87 For example, enrollment and attendance in school is
a necessary but not sufficient condition for receiving an education. Participants did not seem to
perform any better in school or on the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examinations, nor did
the program cover the cost of tutoring for these exams, which can be difficult to pass.88 Even
though the program was used in tandem with other projects to improve education quality in
Bangladesh, including the recruitment of additional teachers, some authors criticized the
program for not doing enough to improve education quality.89
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It is unclear if the stipend program eliminated the phenomena of son-bias in education.
Evidence from Asadullah and Chaudhury suggest that even if the gender gap has reversed in
Bangladesh, the “pass-rate of females in secondary school certiﬁcate (SSC) exams is lower
relative to boys, particularly in rural areas” and that numeracy and literacy skills revealed a
gender bias against girls.90 Findings in rural Bangladesh revealed that decisions about girls’
education were still strictly controlled by fathers, and that mothers were largely excluded from
education decisions regarding their children.91
Most importantly though, the program was criticized for failing to sufficiently help girls
in underserved areas. The stipend amount was the same for everyone and did not increase if girls
came from poorer backgrounds. A study by Behrman found that a family with lower
socioeconomic status led to a “decreased probability of stipend participation.” She suggests that
this is because higher socioeconomic status families “have different preferences about children’s
schooling or are better at navigating the school system and gaining access to stipends.”92 She
concludes that stipend programs “can improve absolute schooling for populations while failing to
reduce relative achievement gaps between children of different socioeconomic backgrounds.”93
Having a program apply without any targeting other than meeting the conditions also meant that
because some families may have been receiving the stipend even if they would have sent their
girls to school without it. The different perspectives on targeting became very clear as discussion
turned to the future of the program from the involved actors.
4.5 Analysis of Involved Political Actors
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The arrangement between domestic and international actors created some tension on the
topic of targeting and future programs. During discussions of renewal, international donors
sought results or evidence of changing behavior, and therefore strove for more specific targeting,
while the government wanted to promote wider coverage and access.94 Donors were reluctant to
increase stipend amounts for the very poorest, unless the universal aspect of the stipend was
withdrawn to focus on the neediest. Meanwhile, the government, who provided 60% of the
funding, was opposed to more stringent targeting.95 The lack of targeting made the program
extremely expensive, costing 15% of the secondary education budget and 6% of the total
education budget.96 Other CCT programs have more stringent targeting mechanisms to maximize
efficiency. Authors like Schurmann argue that the Government of Bangladesh wanted to keep the
program untargeted for the “popularity and electoral support it provided.”97
Once gender parity was achieved, subsequent programs have focused on targeting the
poorest boys and girls and providing them with stipends and tuition coverage. This program was
known as the Secondary Education Quality and Access Enhancement Project (SEQAEP) and it
was launched in 2008 with the support of the International Development Association (IDA).98 To
address the concerns of previous programs, these new programs have “quality-enhancing”
incentives and proxy means testing-targeting rather than universal coverage.99 It would appear
that donors’ push for stringent targeting, the expenses of running a national program, and the
achievement of gender parity forced the program and the Government of Bangladesh to adopt
more stringent targeting.
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4.4 Conclusion
After its scaling up to a national program in 1993, the Female Stipend Program is credited
with the dynamic improvements in the enrollment of girls in secondary school in Bangladesh that
have occurred since the 1990s. Adolescent girl’s attendance in secondary school was prioritized
due to the unique cultural practices and income barriers that put them at a disadvantage for
receiving an education. In addition to the increase in enrollment, other positive short and longterm outcomes were observed in impact reports, including increased age at marriage and birth
spacing, improvements in family health and impacts on employment and earning level. Debates
about future programs and targeting revealed tensions between political actors, but eventually,
gender parity in education was achieved, and on average, girls are now attending school at
slightly higher rates than boys.

5

Case Study: Pakistan

5.1 Introduction
The Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) was implemented in the Punjab province
in 2004 and successfully increased secondary school enrollment for girls. Impact reports also
revealed improvements in short and long-term indicators, such as drop-out rates, enrollment
rates, later earning and consumption habits, and age of marriage.100 This case study will cover
the program’s origins, design, and outcomes, in order to analyze the program’s successes and
shortcomings.
5.2 Origins
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The stipend was implemented as part of the Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme
(PESRP) undertaken by the Provincial Government of Punjab and development partners in
2004.101 The reforms themselves had three strategic pillars: “public finance reforms to realign
expenditures at the provincial and district level toward education and other pro-poor
expenditures; devolution and public sector management reforms; and education sector reforms to
improve quality, access, and governance of the education system.”102 These reforms introduced
the female secondary cash transfer program alongside improvements to the supply side,
including free textbook programs, the hiring of 50, 000 teachers, the establishment of
“community-based school councils,” and the establishment of a performance- based monitoring
system.103 Around 30, 000 schools received additional class rooms and toilets, and the reforms
provided financing for 300 private schools to support students from lower income families.104
The Punjab province was the first to undergo education reforms and was chosen because of
its size.105 Out of the four provinces (Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa),
Punjab is the most populous, comprising almost 60% of the total population of Pakistan, and
produces 57% of Pakistan’s GDP.106 In Pakistan, responsibility over public education is largely
devolved to the provincial level.107 In 2000, Pakistan introduced devolution reforms that gave
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district governments the responsibility to deliver basic education.108 Much of the PESRP
program fell under the personal oversight of the Chief Minister of the province of Punjab.109 In
2011, the then-Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif made “unprecedented” political investments into
the program, personally leading “stock take meetings to review the performance of districts and
the School Education Department against pre-aligned goals and targets.”110 At the primary level,
both public and private schools are better funded, making them more affordable and
accessible.111 However, secondary education in Pakistan is made up of mostly public schools,
and not every village has access to middle schools (grades 6 to 8) or secondary schools (grades 9
and 10).112 This is particularly detrimental to girls, who are even less likely to attend schools
farther away due to safety concerns.113 In 1992, less than a quarter of girls in Pakistan were
enrolled in secondary school nationally (Figure 7).
Figure 7: Secondary School Gross Enrollment Before and After Stipend114
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World
Bank Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/
1992
2006
Girls
18.73%
28.02%
Boys
37.43%
36.08%
Girls in Pakistan face many similar obstacles to receiving an education as girls in many
other developing countries. The most significant barriers, however, are poverty and cultural
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practices. Studies have shown that impoverished households are even less likely to send girls to
school compared to their male siblings.115 Girls provide more “child labor inputs to the
household’s economic activities and domestic chores,” and thus poor households are more likely
to rely on girls’ labor.116 Patriarchal values also factor into this gender gap in education; women
are frequently restricted to the private sphere, married at a young age, or face mobility
restrictions, which all create barriers to girls’ secondary education.117 Due to this direct
relationship between parental income and girl’s enrollment in school, conditional cash transfers
have become a popular development strategy because they ease the financial deterrents
associated with girls’ education and positively incentivize investments in girls’ education.
5.2 Program Design
The Punjab Female School Stipend (FSSS) provides eligible students in grades 6- 8 600
Pakistani rupees (roughly 10 USD) quarterly if they attended a minimum of 80% of school
days.118 Recipients were selected based on sixteen districts in Punjab with the lowest literacy
rates.119 Females were eligible for the stipend only if they attend public secondary schools,
demonstrating the public focus of the reform agenda.”120 The districts chosen were
Bahawalnagar, Bahwalpur, Bhakkar, Chinniot, Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Kasur, Khanewal,
Layyah, Lodhran, Muzaffargarh, Okara, Pakpattan, Rajanpur, Rahim Yar Khan and Vehari,
which are located in the south of the province (Figure 8).121 In 2006, the program was expanded
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to girls in grades 9 and 10.122 Schools in stipend districts are required to keep records of class
attendance and every quarter, the list of all eligible students is submitted to the Executive District
Office for Education (EDO).123 Stipend requests are then sent to the Program Monitoring and
Implementation Unit (PMIU), the EDO receives and transfers the stipend to post offices or
through the schools to the households of the girls.124 The process takes about 10-14 weeks, and
recipients sign a receipt to acknowledge they received the payment.125
Figure 8: Geographical Coverage of the Stipend Program
Source: IEG (Independent Evaluation Group). 2011.” Do Conditional Cash Transfers Lead to Medium-Term
Impacts?: Evidence from a Female School Stipend Program in Pakistan.” Washington, DC: World Bank.
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By 2007, the stipend program had reached 245,000 middle school beneficiaries.126 An
expansion of the PESRP, called the Second Punjab Education Sector Reform Program (PESRP
II), was launched in 2012.127 The program is currently ongoing, and the PESRP website
describes the program’s goals as “improving enrollment, increasing retention, reducing gender
disparities and enhancing female prestige.”128 From 2013-2014, the program boasted 411,000
recipients from grades 8-10, with the same condition of 80% attendance.129
5.4 Outcomes
The program was largely successful at achieving its goals. An impact report from 2006
revealed that female middle school enrollment rate in the provinces increased from 43%
(baseline 2003) to 53% in 2005.130 It was found that girls who received the stipends were more
likely to complete middle school and high school.131 The female dropout rates between grade 5
and 6 decreased by 25% and by 20% for middle school.132 Additionally, child labor seems to
have been affected by the stipend. Girls’ participation in unpaid family work fell, and labor force
participation of adolescent girls in stipend districts fell by 4–5 percentage points compared to
those in non-stipend areas.133 Girls in stipend districts were able to delay marriage on average by
1.4 years and have 0.3 fewer children (marginally significant in a statistical sense).134 While the
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program was renewed, the only available impact reports come from 2006-2009, and do not cover
the PSERP II, the program’s renewal that began in 2012. More impact reports must be
completed, to fully understand the other short and long-term effects of the program.
Some authors have said that the program’s costs outweigh its benefits, because “the
stipend cannot distinguish between children who would be going to school anyway, or children
who change their decision as a result of the stipend, or children who would not go to school with
or without the stipend.”135 This could be a result of the targeting, which was limited to girls in
districts with low literacy rates, but did not measure who would be going to school without the
incentive. A few inconsistencies in the program’s implementation have also been reported. In
some of the provinces, there was confusion about the criteria for the program. In Bahawalpur, it
was reported that parents were unaware of the requirements for receiving the stipend, and it has
been recommended that the local administration make more of an effort to raise awareness of the
program.136 In another province, Rahim Yar Khan, ATM cards for stipend participants were
under issued, leaving many without their stipend program.137
Additionally, impact assessments of the FSSS revealed that parents responded to the
program by sending their sons to private primary schools.138 Studies have also shown that even
in rich families, where income is not a deterrent to girls’ education, parents in Pakistan prefer to
send their daughters to public school over private.139 The number of private schools in Punjab
has increased since the beginning of the stipend program. In 2003 before the stipend program,
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there were around 19, 000 private schools.140 In 2002, forty-four thousand government primary
schools, seven thousand government middle schools, four to five thousand government high
schools, and five hundred higher secondary schools.141 In latest estimates of the Punjab province,
there are approximately 60,000 government schools and 35,000 private schools.142 Fees in
private schools are often low and below cost of the FSSS stipend.143 Children who study in
private schools score substantially higher in tests in all subjects and receive a better quality
education.144 This evidence would suggest that girls continue to be at disadvantage when they
compete with male siblings for resources towards their education. Further assessments of the
stipend program should take this trend into account, as it calls into question the quality of
education received by girls compared to their male counterparts, potentially widening the gender
gap in education in a different way. One of the most important policies of the Punjab education
reforms was the Private School Census in 2016-17 to evaluate the growth and impact of private
schools.145 There has been explosive growth of “self-owned, nonreligious, for-proﬁt private
schools” in Punjab since the 1990s, which has been described as “decentralized and market
based.”146 Gathering information on the impact of private schools is a crucial first step in
achieving some level of standardization.
5.5 Analysis of Involved Political Actors
The stipend program and broader education reforms in Punjab are significantly
influenced by domestic and international politics. Education reform programs in Punjab are
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supported by two international donors, the World Bank and the UK’s Department for
International Development (DFID). Figure 9 depicts the breakdown of Phase II funding found in
a World Bank report from 2015 and shows how the program continues to be funded by a
combination of donors and the Pakistani government. The DFID and the Bank have also
provided “technical and professional assistance” and participate in a bimonthly conference with
the Chief Minister Punjab, heads of Education Departments, and Finance, Planning and
Development Departments, to monitor the program’s progress.147 The PESRP reforms have been
described by the World Bank as having a “country-wide” impact, with the Government of
Pakistan acknowledging the Bank’s positive role and requesting “similar programmatic support
for other provinces of the country.”148
Figure 9: Financing of PESRP II
Source:http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/282311468083333884/pdf/875500REVISED000Meetings02014000May.pdf
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This level of international involvement is likely because of Pakistan’s difficulties in
reaching its Millennium Development Goals as well as its economic struggles. The UK’s
Department for International Development website justifies its support of development projects
in Pakistan for the sake of “millions of poor Pakistanis, and the stability and security of both the
region and the UK.”149 While highlighting Pakistan’s high levels of poverty and inequality, high
risk of natural disasters, and extremism and militancy, the department claims to support the
growth of democracy and government institutions.150 Additionally, the countries have a notable
relationship; Pakistan is also a former British colony and the United Kingdom is home to a
sizable population of British Pakistanis. Foreign aid towards Pakistan is also typically associated
with the strategic significance of the country and the security concerns of the United States and
its allies. The United Kingdom was among the countries that invaded Afghanistan alongside the
United States in 2001. Exact figures of total multilateral and bilateral aid to Pakistan come from
a variety of sources are often contradictory and vague. This international security interest in
Pakistan, especially when considering the dominance of the Pakistani military on society and
politics, makes transparency, accountability, and monitoring an important part of the donor
process, to make sure that funding goes directly to development projects.
5.6 Conclusion
Punjab’s Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) was successful increasing the
enrollment rate of girls at the secondary school level. Other positive externalities were also
observed, including marriage and birth delays, and positive impacts on later consumption and
earning levels. These is significant room for further study; targeting districts may need to be
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adjusted, and impact reports of the stipend on high school beneficiaries are needed. Another
interesting factor is the relationship between girls and parental decisions for private versus public
schooling. If this trend of sending boys to private school over girls continues, the gender gap in
education would decrease, but the quality of education could potentially increase. Studying the
impact of private schooling on gender and investing in more in education on a national scale
would help maximize the benefits of the cash transfers and help Pakistan achieve its global
development and constitutional education commitments.
The purpose of this section of the paper is to compare the Female Stipend Program (FSP) in
Bangladesh and the Female Secondary School Stipend (FSSS) in Pakistan, in order to determine
why the Bangladesh program was so successful, and what lessons about CCTs in South Asia
could be drawn from comparing the programs. First, outcomes are compared, in order to
determine how the programs differed. Finally, four factors- program design, education system
differences, political factors, and economic factors- were analyzed in order to determine why the
programs had different outcomes.
6.1 Outcomes Analysis
Figure 10: Bangladesh, Secondary School Enrollment,
Before and After Stipend, and Most Recent
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/
1990
1998
2016
Girls
13.67%
42.18%
72.49%
Boys
26.8% s
44.88%
65.61%
Figure 11: Pakistan, Secondary School Enrollment,
Before and After Stipend, and Most Recent
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/
1992
2006
2016
Girls
18.73%
28.02%
41.116%
Boys
37.43%
36.08%
50.72%
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In terms of outcomes, the stipend program had a larger impact on Bangladesh. Girls’
enrollment increased at a much larger rate, from 13.67% in 1990 to 42.18% in 1998 (Figure 10).
In Pakistan, the stipend program increased female secondary school enrollment rate in the Punjab
province increased from 43% before the program to 53% in 2005.151 National female secondary
school enrollment rate increased from 1992 to 2006 by about 10% and is about 41% today
(Figure 11). It was difficult to find enrollment statistics for both countries, as both had several
years missing from the data available.
While the gross enrollment rates for Pakistan were missing from World Bank database
for the years between 1992 and 2006, Pakistan’s national and regional progress were found using
the Gender Parity Index for secondary education (Figure 12).152 The GPI for Pakistan has
increased overtime but appears to have fluctuated, from 0.75 in 2001/02 before the stipend
program, to 0.81 in 2011/12. Punjab has the highest GPI compared to other regions but has
experienced fluctuations in reaching a higher GPI. For example, the GPI increased after 2004/05
after the program began, but decreased in 2007/08, increased, and then decreased again in
2011/12. To compare, Bangladesh has been able to achieve and maintain gender parity (Figure
13).
Figure 12: Gender Parity Index, Secondary School, Pakistan
Source: Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform Government, “Pakistan Millennium
Development Goals Report 2013,” Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2013,
http://www.pk.undp.org/content/dam/pakistan/docs/MDGs/MDG2013Report/final%20report.pdf.
Region
2001/02 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2007/08 2008/09 2010/11 2011/12
Pakistan
0.75
0.77
0.78
0.78
0.82
0.80
0.85
0.81
Punjab
0.86
0.87
0.84
0.88
0.94
0.91
0.97
0.85
Sindh
0.68
0.74
0.83
0.77
0.77
0.76
0.79
0.84
Andrabi, Das, Khwaja, Vishwanath, and Zajonc. “Pakistan: Learning and Educational Achievements in Punjab
Schools (LEAPS): Insights to inform the education policy debate.” Learning and Educational Achievement in
Punjab Schools (LEAPS) Report, 2007.
152
The index refers to the ratio of females to males enrolled in schools and is measured using net enrollment of
students in the class level of 6-10.
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0.49
0.57

0.61
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0.50

0.60
041

0.59
0.41

Figure 13: Gender Parity Index, Secondary School, Bangladesh
Source: General Economics Division (GED) Bangladesh Planning. “Bangladesh Progress Report
2015” Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, September 2015.

Year
GPI

1991
0.52

1995
0.82

2000
1.06

2005
1.04

2010
1.14

2011
1.13

Overall, both countries have seen an increase in enrollment for both genders, likely
because of the investments in education since the 1990s. Both programs had positive short and
long-term interests (Figure 14).
Figure 14: Outcomes Comparison, Bangladesh and Pakistan
Bangladesh’s FSP
Pakistan’s FSSS
Shortterm

In 1990, the gross national secondary school enrollment
for girls was 13.67%, compared to 26.8% for boys.
After the program began in 1993, female enrollment
at the secondary level doubled between 1990 and
1997 to nearly 3 million girls.
In 1991, only 20% of women in Bangladesh were
literate, and in secondary school, only 33% of
enrolled students and 29% of graduates were girls.
In 2013, the literacy rate for women ages 15-24 years
is around 80%.
In 2016, gross national secondary school enrollment
was 72.49% for girls and 65.61% for boys.

Longterm

Mahmud:
Increased age at marriage, greater birth spacing,
positive attitude to smaller family size, and higher
employment and earning levels.
The program appeared to improve some attitudes
among community leaders and the general population
towards female secondary education.
Lutfunnahar Begum, Asad Islam, and Russell
Smyth:
For each additional year of schooling undertaken by
older siblings, the number of years of schooling
completed by younger siblings increases by about
0.13 years.
Shamsuddin:
Exposure to five years of the program led to “one-year
increase in education level completed and an increase
in female labor force participation by six percentage

LEAPS: Female secondary school
enrollment rate in the province increased
from 43% (baseline 2003) to 53% in 2005.
Andaleeb Alam, Javier Baez, and
Ximena Del Carpio: Girls who received the
stipends were more likely to complete
middle school and high school.
Female dropout rates between grade 5 and 6
decreased by 25% and by 20% for middle
school
Girls’ participation in unpaid family work
fell, and labor force participation of
adolescent girls in stipend districts fell by
4–5%
LEAPS: Girls in stipend districts were able
to delay marriage on average by 1.4 years
and have 0.3 fewer children (marginally
significant in a statistical sense).
Andaleeb Alam, Javier Baez, and Ximena
Del Carpio: Parents responded to the
program by sending their sons to private
primary schools.
National enrollment of girls in secondary
school increased by about 10%.
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points. It also found that wages decrease by about
17% because the women have difﬁculties in ﬁnding a
good job and end up in low productivity selfemployment work.
Hahn et. all:
Short-term decline in fertility from remaining in
school was sustained in the long-term.
Participants were “more likely to work in the formal
sector and less likely in the agricultural or informal
sector” and “married more educated husbands who
had a better occupation and who were closer in age to
their own age.”
“the children of eligible women were taller and
heavier for their age, suggesting that the stipend
generated positive intergenerational health effects.”

MDGs

Bangladesh surpassed MDG 3, Target 3.1: Eliminate
gender disparity in primary and secondary school

Pakistan unable to meet MDG 3

It is important to keep in mind that the program in Pakistan occurred much more recently.
Bangladesh’s program began in 1993, twenty-five years ago, and Pakistan’s began in 2003,
fifteen years ago. Pakistan’s program is also still on-going according to the PSERP website. The
complete impact of the program, therefore, is unknown, and it is possible that Pakistan could see
larger gains in secondary enrollment for girls as time goes by. Meanwhile, Bangladesh’s
program has been replaced with a stipend program as a part of the Secondary Education Quality
and Access Enhancement Project (SEQAEP) since 2008 and targets both underprivileged boys
and girls.
The biggest takeaway is that both programs raised girls’ enrollment in secondary school.
These results are highly consistent with the existing literature on conditional cash transfers.
CCTs perform best at improving quantitative indicators for health and education. For example,
enrollment in secondary school is a quantitative indicator that is often used in development
statistics. CCTs do not necessary improve the quality of health or education, and enrollment
statistics do not show the varying quality of education that children are receiving.
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6.2 Analysis of Factors
This section of the paper analyzes the programmatic, systemic, political, and economic factors
that may have contributed to the end of the gender gap in Bangladesh.
6.2.1 Factor 1: Programmatic Differences
According to the literature, the success of a stipend program heavily depends on
calibrating the right conditions and targeting. Bangladesh’s program featured much more
stringent conditions, meanwhile Pakistan’s program only required 80% attendance of school
days in order to receive the stipend (Figure 15). Girls’ stipends in Bangladesh increased with
grades, providing increasing incentive for staying in school and discouraging dropping out. It
also required that they stay unmarried. Pakistan’s program only required attendance of 80% of
school days, did not have the marriage condition, and the stipend amount was the same for all
grades. Additionally, girls had to receive at least 45% on their exams in Bangladesh. Perhaps one
of the reasons Bangladesh saw more success in girls’ secondary school enrollment could be the
more stringent conditions of its CCT. While the FSP required slightly less attendance, the
program was more committed to other factors that might affect parents’ decisions to send girls to
secondary school, such as marriage.
Figure 15: Program Design Comparisons
Bangladesh’s FSP
Conditions
Conditional on 75% attendance of the
school year, at least 45% marks on
exams, and remaining unmarried
Targeting
Female students enrolled in
recognized institutions in rural
upazilas where the program was
taking place (covered 460 of the
some 492 upazilas in Bangladesh)
Stipend Amount Girl’s tuition fees and a monthly
stipend, increased with grade

Pakistan’s FSSS
Must attend a minimum of 80%
of school days
Female students in sixteen
districts in Punjab with the lowest
literacy rates. Grades 6- 8 in
2004, expanded to grades 9 and
10 in 2006
600 Pakistani rupees (roughly 10
USD) quarterly
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Girls Reached at
Peak
Cost

In 2002, the program reached
4,193,352 girls. The amount
decreased after
In 2000, the program cost the
government of Bangladesh 3.9 billion
takas.

By 2007, the stipend program had
reached 245,000. By 2013, the
program reached 411,000.
The government of Pakistan
provided US$ 3,387.7 million to
PESRP II in 2012.

The two programs also had a completely different scope. The stipend program in Bangladesh
was on a national scale, while the program in Pakistan was only implemented in the Punjab
province. This is reflected in the number of girls reached and the cost of the programs.
Bangladesh was able to reach millions of girls, but also spent several billion takas, or
$46,591,077 USD. The Punjab Education Reforms cost $3, 387.7 million USD, but it was
unclear how much of that reform budget was spent on the cash transfer program. CCTs often
focus on making targeting most efficient, in order to minimize program costs and only reach
households that would not be incentivized without the stipend. However, targeting is difficult
and expensive to measure, sometimes done with proxy means testing or household surveys.
Neither of these programs in South Asia relied on these sorts of targeting, and instead made the
assumption that girls in lower literacy rates or rural upazilas faced collective economic and
cultural barriers to education from their households and chose to target the stipends to these
populations. Stipend amount may have also played a role in Bangladesh’s success. The FSP gave
smaller, more frequent monthly stipends that increased with girls’ age, while Pakistan’s FSSS
gave larger amounts quarterly that did not change. Across CCT literature, there is no universal
amount recommended for programs to be effective, just that it must be enough to overcome a
household’s opportunity costs to conform the program’s requirements. It is possible that scaling
up the stipend amount as girls continued in school provided additional incentive that contributed
to Bangladesh’s progress. Both programs targeted girls in secondary school and incentivized
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enrollment rates with stipend payments, but there were also crucial programmatic design
differences that may have impacted the programs’ success. With the current data available, it is
impossible to say whether one program design aspect made more of difference or not, however,
future research could to try and isolate program design aspects to find this answer. Pakistan
might draw some lessons from Bangladesh’s program, particularly in terms of targeting and
stipend amount, which will be discussed in the recommendations section.
6.2.2 Factor 2: Differences in Educational Systems
By comparing the education systems of both countries, this section seeks to observe whether
Bangladesh’s program performed better due to factors regarding their education system. From
what information was available from the World Bank, the governments of Bangladesh and
Pakistan spend comparable amounts of their GDP on Education, although Pakistan spends
slightly more (Figure 16). The governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh spend less on education
compared to the rest of the region of South Asia, and Bangladesh has a slightly higher HDI value
than Pakistan (Figure 17).

Figure 16: Government Expenditure on Education over
Time
(% of GDP)
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Figure 17: Human Development Indicators and Percentage (%) of
GDP spent on Education for South Asia Countries
Sources: http://hdr.undp.org/en/countries
http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/2.7
Country
HDI
HDI Value
GDP
GSP
Ranking 2018 2018
Spent,
Spent,
2009
2013
Afghanistan 168
0.498
n/a
3.5%
Bangladesh 136
0.608
1.9%
2.0%
Bhutan
134
0.612
4.6%
5.6%
India
130
0.640
3.3%
3.8%
Maldives
101
0.717
5.8%
3.8%
Nepal
149
0.574
4.7%
3.5%
Pakistan
150
0.562
2.6%
2.5%
Sri Lanka
76
0.770
2.1%
1.6%
From these statistics, one might be tempted to conclude that education in Bangladesh and
Pakistan are fairly comparable; their governments spend similar amounts on education and both
struggle with reaching complete secondary school enrollment. However, upon closer
examination, the education systems of Pakistan and Bangladesh are very different. Unlike
Bangladesh, where the public education system is highly centralized, Pakistan has devolved
responsibility over public education to the provincial level.153
In 2010, Pakistan added an 18th amendment to its Constitution, and Article 25a of that
amendment called for free and compulsory education for all children aged 5–16 years
old.154 Despite this lofty commitment, Pakistan has been unable to deliver on its educational
promises. Education governance in Pakistan lacks stability and consistency. Provincializing
education led to the abolition of the federal Ministry of Education (MoE).155 The same 18th

Nazmul Chaudhury and Dilip Parajuli, “Conditional Cash Transfers and Female Schooling: The Impact of the
Female School Stipend Program on Public School Enrollments in Punjab, Pakistan,” The World Bank, December 1,
2006. https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:wbk:wbrwps:4102.
154
Allah Bakhsh Malik, “Policy Analysis of Education in Punjab Province,” UNESCO, November 2011,
http://unesco.org.pk/education/documents/situationanalysis/Education_Policy_Analysis_for_Punjab.pdf.
155
Mehnaz Aziz David E. Bloom Salal Humair Emmanuel Jimenez Larry Rosenberg Zeba Sathar, “Education
System Reform in Pakistan: Why, When, and How?” IZA Policy Paper No. 76, January 2014, 22.
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amendment was wrought with controversy and devolving education to the provincial level was
challenges by the Supreme Court in November 2011.156 The government then took an existing
ministry, the Ministry of Professional Education and Trainings, and turned it into the Ministry of
Education and Training (MoET).157 Not only did this create a great deal of instability in
education policymaking, but the MoET lacks clear roles, responsibilities, and authority,
especially in relation to provincial ministries of education.158
Education reform on the national level has also been highly inconsistent across sectors
and beholden to political whims. Education reforms on the national level prior to 2000 were
“overwhelmingly marginalized in favor of primary education” at the behest of donors.159 The
Higher Education Commission (HEC), created in 2002, attempted to alleviate the sector
differences, but have faced a reduced budget and pressure to investigate “degrees of sitting
parliamentarians” by the Supreme Court, leaving it with few political allies.160 It is unclear
whether the HEC or the MoET are responsible for higher education in Pakistan.
The limitations of the education system in Pakistan might also be attributed to how the
government spends its education budget. Currently, the government of Pakistan spends 2.4% of
its GDP on education, with 89% of this budget used towards teacher’s salaries and 11% towards
development.161 To compare, around the time of Bangladesh’s stipend program, the development
budget was 58% of the education sector.162 Corruption and transparency are also a factor in the
case of Pakistan’s education system. According to an article by The Economist published this
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year, Pakistan’s political parties have used teaching jobs “as a way of recruiting election workers
and rewarding allies,” with some pocketing the salary and not turning up to classes.163 There are
concerns about the credibility of enrolment statistics and lack of transparency from the provincial
minister’s quarterly meetings.164
Due to the provincialization of Pakistan, using national statistics for education funding
and statistics can be misleading, because it is difficult to depict the differences in education
indicators across provinces, and differences in education quality can skew national statistics. The
most recent data that could be found for provincial education statistics were literacy rates across
provinces from 2014 (Figure 18). While gender specific literacy rates for the provinces were
unavailable, it is clear that literacy rates are higher in Punjab compared to the rest of the country.
Figure 18: Literacy Rates in Pakistan by Province
Source: Abdul Rehman, Luan Jingdong, and Imran Hussain, “The Province-Wise Literacy Rate in Pakistan and
Its Impact on the Economy,” Pacific Science Review B: Humanities and Social Sciences 1, no. 3 (November
2015): 140–44, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.psrb.2016.09.001 .

Year
1972
1998
2010
2013
2014

Punjab
Sindh
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Balochistan
20.07%
30.20%
15.50%
10.10%
46.60%
45.30%
35.40%,
26.60%
71%
69%
60%
50%
62%
60%
52%
44%
61%
56%
53%.
43%
Pakistan encompasses several ethnic groups with none holding a clear majority, and

unifies the country through Islam, a common language in Urdu, and a federalist government
structure (Figure 19). After the secession of Bangladesh, Pakistan’s Constitution was rewritten in
1973 with a bicameral legislature that gave Punjab, the most populous province, the most seats in
the National Assembly.165 These circumstances gave Punjab a financial and political advantage

“School reform: Pakistan is home to the most frenetic education reforms in the world.” The Economist, January
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over the other provinces. Any political party seeking to come to power in Pakistan has to be
mindful of the Punjab vote, and this has led to some tension with other provinces.166 For
example, despite the fact that Punjab is more urbanized and wealthier than other provinces, it
frequently receives the highest allocation of national resources because of its size and political
influence.167 This has led for calls by other provinces to create a Seraiki province in Southern
Punjab, an area that is much less developed than the rest of the province and is linguistically
distinct. 168 The female stipend program targeted the districts in Punjab with the lowest literacy
rates, which happened to be all clustered in the south (Figure 9). These political factors provide
some insight into why the Punjab education reforms took place, and why the stipend program
occurred in certain districts of Punjab.
Figure 19: Ethnic Breakdown of Pakistan
Source: The World Factbook 2013-14, Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013.
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To truly address Pakistan’s difficulties in reaching national education goals, the government
be clearer about who is responsible for education reforms, and reforms and funding must be
spread more equitably across the country. Efforts to replicate the female stipend program in other
provinces have been met with mixed results. In the Sindh province, newspapers reported that
Larkana district students did not receive their stipend in 2013 after the program launched for
“unknown reasons.”169 The FSSS and Punjab’s education reforms have been beneficial for
Punjab, and because of its size, may have driven up the country’s enrollment rates, but it can
only do so much for education in the county as a whole.
Studies of Pakistan’s stipend program revealed that parents responded to the program by
sending their sons to private primary schools, while daughters remained in public school. Around
63% of middle schools (grades 6-8) in Pakistan and around 66% of secondary schools are private
schools (grades 9-10).170 According to the National Education Policy Report published in 2017,
most of the country’s private schools are for male children only.171 Some of Pakistan’s madrasas
have been accused in some regions of the country of perpetuating extremism.172 Meanwhile in
Bangladesh, since private schools make up over 95% of the country’s secondary schools, parents
did not have the ability to send their female children to a public school and their sons to private
school. Private schools in Bangladesh also became coeducational around the time of the stipend.
A study by Asadullah and Chaudhury found that the rise of NGO-funded primary schools
directly contributed to an increase in enrollments in religious secondary schools to cater to these
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new primary school students.173 Registered madrasas saw a higher growth in enrolment of girls
in secondary grades during 1999–2003, and schools that switched from male to coed also
experienced higher enrolment growth.174 Madrasas located in areas with a larger number of
BRAC schools saw a higher growth in female enrolment.175 Additionally, a report published by
the Berkley Center for Religion, Peace & World Affairs in 2016 found that the proportion of
madrasa students that were female increased from 7.7 percent in 1990 to 52 percent in 2008.176
These results indicate that the coeducation in private, religious education played an important
role in ending the gender gap in Bangladesh. Pakistan seems to lack the pressure of NGO schools
that Bangladesh experienced.
The benefit of the privatization of schools in Pakistan is also unclear. Michael Barber,
DFID’s Pakistan Education Task Force Co-chair, has described that overall, Pakistani education
system as very poor, citing how 60% of schools have no electricity and 34 % are without
drinking water.1 He posits that low-cost private education “delivers better performance than the
public schools at less than half the unit cost.”2 Other authors have argued that low-income
private schools exacerbate inequities and argue in favor of a stronger public school system.3 As
part of the Punjab education reforms, a greater effort has been made to reach public-private
partnership in education and provide public financing of private schools.4 The relationship
between girls’ education and public versus private school in these two countries, as well as the

Mohammad Niaz Asadullah and Nazmul Chaudhury, “Peaceful Coexistence? The Role of Religious Schools and
NGOs in the Growth of Female Secondary Schooling in Bangladesh,” Journal of Development Studies 49, no. 2
(February 2013): 223–37.
174
Ibid.
175
Ibid.
176
Islam and Development in Bangladesh: A Grassroots Perspective, 156.
173

Gibbons 49
nature of the Pakistani education system, could be one explanation for why Bangladesh
experienced a higher level of success in ending the gender gap compared to Pakistan’s FSSS.
6.2.3 Factor 3: Political Analysis
Bangladesh seems to have more political will towards development than Pakistan. This can
be seen at the surface level, where it has a higher HDI ranking and higher life expectancies than
other South Asian countries. Analysis of the political actors within Bangladesh revealed that
grassroots organizing has played a key role in development since the country’s independence.
NGOs in Bangladesh
The presence of NGOs has since the creation of Bangladesh has created stronger mechanisms
for accountability in development. After the 1971 War of Independence, Bangladesh experienced
serious poverty, famine, and hunger, and foreign donors became attracted to supporting “certain
rudimentary forms of NGO at the grassroots level to alleviate alarming conditions in
Bangladesh.”177 For example, one of the world’s largest NGOs, Bangladesh Rehabilitation
Assistance Committee (BRAC), was founded around this time to provide “relief and
rehabilitation” to the displaced.178 Bangladesh then experienced periods of authoritarianism and
military rule from 1975 and 1990 during which martial law was declared, the constitution
suspended, and political parties disbanded.179 During this time, NGOs actually “expanded
considerably,” and were supported by the regime
“to enhance its legitimacy at the grassroots level, coopt and use large NGOS as
substitutes for opposition political parties and, more importantly, respond to the emerging
global trend toward greater NGO power since the early 1980s.”180
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It has been argued that the military government attempted to project modernization to increase
donor funding and selected women’s rights issues to achieve this end.181 This is evinced by
actions by the military government of Ziaur Rahman to “establish a women’s affairs division in
the president’s secretariat in 1976,” which coincided with the UN Decade for women.182 During
the subsequent democratization era, the volume of NGOs continued to increase, and parties
relied on established NGOs for grassroots organizing and mobilization, giving NGOs a
significant amount of political leverage.183 While the presence of NGOs is not unique to
Bangladesh, and recent decades have seen a “massive proliferation” of NGOs around the world,
there are certain factors that make Bangladesh particularly appealing to donors.184 In addition to
the natural disasters that the country has faced, Bangladesh is “one of the most densely populated
countries in the world,” with a significant impoverished population.185
The sheer volume of NGOs in Bangladesh indicates their influence; there are roughly
23,000 NGOs operating and registered in Bangladesh.186 The NGO sector has a unique
relationship with the people and government. Donors are influenced by trends in the “global
development industry,” and when donors lose interest in a project, funding ceases.187 For
example, microcredit programs among NGOs spread across Bangladesh due to their popularity
among donors, demonstrating just how much sway donors can have over the process.188
Organizations are accountable to their donors, and the target group is often not included in the
decision-making process.189 Governments are then forced to acknowledge NGO’s role in
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development, legitimizing itself through donor support and “publicizing any signs of approval
from foreign agencies.”190
Immediately after democratization, established NGOs had political leverage because they
had established grassroots connections and could provide voter mobilization. This was most
apparent in the election of 1996, when the government and NGOs launched “voter education
campaigns” and the elections in 1996 and 2001 reached a voter turnout of 75%, with women
making up roughly half. This led the Jamaat-i-Islam party, which performed poorly in the 1996
election with three out of three hundred seats gained, to blame their loss on NGOs turning
mobilized rural women against the Jamaat.191 It is more likely, however, that rural women voted
in their own self-interest and perceived that the party “presented a threat to the employment and
educational opportunities afford rural women by the NGOs.”192 Instead, they voted for other
parties, such as the Awami League, the Bangladesh National Party, or the Jatiyo Party, because
they believed the Jamaat party was opposed to NGOs and women working outside the home.193
NGOs role in education in Bangladesh has also faced criticism from Jamaat, who have
opposed the content of curriculum and coeducation.194 There were instances of violent
opposition to NGO presence in schools in the mid-1990s, including the burning of BRAC
schools, and accusations that foreign funded schools were proselytizing Christianity.195 Rivalry
between Islamic schools and NGO schools continues today, with local Islamists concerned about
the texts being taught by NGOs.196 While the Jamaat criticize the influence of NGOs and the
curriculum content, they are not necessarily opposed to girls education, and party leaders have
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instead adopted a platform that women should have equal rights to education but separate
education facilities.197 Their policy towards education on their website describes how “Islam
gives equal emphasis on both the education of man and woman.”198 Violent opposition that did
occur in the 1990s towards NGOs-run schools did not protest the idea of girls’ education, but
rather, the content of education being anti-Islamic.199 The electoral importance of NGOs and the
popularity of their programs for women and girls appears to have influenced even the most
conservative elements of Bangladeshi politics. According to a report published in 2016, Jamaate-Islami and other political Islamic groups continue to recognize the political sway held by
secular NGOs in Bangladesh, and “pragmatically interact with secular NGOs despite ideological
differences, particularly in areas where [NGOs] have significant influence in local politics.”200
Opposition in Pakistan
In Pakistan, the opposition to girls’ education can be much more violent and has led to
school burnings and attacks on female students. Literacy rates in tribal areas where girls are not
allowed to attend school can be as low as 9%.201 Over the past decade, hundreds of girls' schools
have been destroyed by militants in Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa, Baluchistan and lawless tribal areas
of Pakistan.202 International attention was drawn to the story of Malala Yousafzai, who survived
being shot by a Taliban gunman for attending school and became the youngest person to win the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2014 for her activism.
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Figure 20: Known Terrorists Incidents on Education Institutes over Time in Pakistan
Source: National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2018). Global
Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.

According to the Global Terrorism Database run by the University of Maryland, there
have been 968 terrorist attacks on educational institutions since 1970, and the frequency of
attacks on educational institution increased dramatically since 2004, the year the stipend program
began (Figure 20). Unfortunately, the database was unable to differentiate between types of
educational institutions, as it would be helpful to know how many attacks on girls’ schools
occurred, nor was it able to divide attacks into provinces. It is possible that increased attacks on
educational institutions in recent years and violent opposition to girls’ education in Pakistan
discouraged parents from sending daughters to school and impeded greater success of the stipend
program.
The differences in political agendas towards gender can be demonstrated by recent
legislation on ending child marriage, a significant barrier to girl’s secondary education. Both
countries have high rates of child marriage, with 21% of girls in Pakistan married before the age
of 18 and 18% of girls in Bangladesh by the age of 15. However, examining recent legal moves
towards ending child marriage reveal differences between the countries. The minimum marriage
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age for women in Bangladesh is 18.203 When the Cabinet tried to approve lowering the
minimum age of marriage from 18 to 16 years for girls, it resulted “in international outcry” and
the Act was delayed and amended.204 Meanwhile, in Pakistan, the National Assembly rejected
increasing the legal age for marriage from 16 to 18 nationwide in 2017.205 Recent rulings from
the Council of Islamic Ideology, “a constitutional body which gives Islamic legal advice to the
Pakistani Government,” declared that Pakistani laws prohibiting child marriage are un-Islamic.206
Changing legislation on child marriage in both countries was met with different obstacles, and
indicates the different pressures each country faces when attempting to alter its laws on this
issue. Bangladesh has a unique political history with role of NGOs and does not face quite the
same opposition to girls’ education as Pakistan, and this could be a reason why they were able to
achieve gender parity.

6.2.4 Factor 4: Economic Changes in Bangladesh
Economic factors may have impacted these education advances for women. In 1990,
agriculture made up 30% of the Bangladesh's GDP, and industry made up 20%.207 In 2017,
industry made up 28% of the GDP, and agriculture declined to 13%.208 The service sector has
also grown significantly, from 46% in 1990 to 53% in 2017.209 These shifts are largely due to
the success of the ready-made garment industry, which has made Bangladesh the second-largest
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garment manufacturer in the world.210 This rising industry has demonstrated a hiring preference
for women and has therefore provided large scale formal sector employment to women not
previously available.211 It is possible that these changes have contributed to the rethinking of
gender relations and women’s role in the public sphere that inspired the Female Stipend
Program. Women’s participation in the ready-made garment industry has significantly altered the
labor composition of the country. It has also been argued that these new opportunities for paid
work provide a level of economic empowerment of women. Some authors like Schurmann have
said that requirements for secondary education in the garment sector alongside NGO programs
and policy interventions may have contributed to the progress in gender equality and gains in
girls’ enrollment in schools in Bangladesh over the last two decades. However, a study by Islam
in three garment factories in Dhaka found that only half of the female employees had completed
primary education, and only 9% had a Secondary School Certificate.212 It is not still clear if this
increase in demand for labor in manufacturing has increased the level of educational attainment
among women. Further studies into the relationship between the garment industry and women’s
education in Bangladesh are needed to determine if there is a correlation.
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Figure 21
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/

The most recent data collected reveals that Bangladesh has a higher percentage of wage
and salaried workers who are female, at 28%, while Pakistan has around 24%. While the
difference is not huge, the trends across the years tell another story; Bangladesh’s percentage
have been steadily growing, jumping from 18% in 2010 to 24% in 2011 (Figure 21). Meanwhile,
Pakistan’s percentage of wage and salaried female workers have fluctuated over the years
(Figure 22).
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Figure 22
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts data files, The World Bank
Group, 2018. https://data.worldbank.org/

As the People’s Republic of Bangladesh shifts away from an agricultural economy,
demand for women’s social and economic participation has increased. It is possible that demand
for educated women in Bangladesh, and therefore, enrollment in secondary school, could be
linked to the rise of the garment industry and available jobs. It is also unclear why Pakistan’s
percentage of wage and salaried female workers has fluctuated so drastically. Economic factors
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could have played a role in Bangladesh’s program to end the gender gap, but with the current
data available, it is impossible to give a conclusive answer.

6.3 Recommendations for FSSS
There are two aspects of Bangladesh’s FSP that Pakistan might learn from; targeting and
stipend amounts. Evidence from Khandker, Pitt, and Fuwa showed that the enrollment benefits
from the stipend program in Bangladesh disproportionately went to girls from households with
larger quantities of owned land.213 One of the criticisms of Bangladesh’s FSP program was that it
failed to reach girls in underserved areas. These authors also therefore recommend land
ownership as a targeting mechanism, citing its use by microfinance programs such as the
Grameen Bank, as a way of making sure stipends are directed towards poorer households.214
Targeting girls from families that own less land could create more stringent targeting, reduce
program costs, and help stipend programs reach underserved populations.
Drawing lessons from Bangladesh’s difficulties in reaching underserved populations, the
Punjab provincial government may want to consider adjusting its targeting for the FSSS using its
incoming National Socio-Economic Registry. As part of different national CCT, the Benazir
Income Support Program (BISP), the database was launched in 2008 “to improve pro-poor
targeting performance of respective social sector programs.”215 The database includes more than
27 million households (approx. 167 million people) and is the first of its kind in South Asia.216
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It is possible that scaling up the stipend amount as girls continued in school provided
additional incentive that contributed to Bangladesh’s progress. The stakeholders behind
Pakistan’s stipend program are experimenting with different program design ideas currently. In
2014, a pilot of the stipend program was launched that had different stipend amounts as girls
advance in secondary school.217 Under this program, 659 rural government schools were
categorized into three groups: Treatment I made up of 143 schools, Treatment II made up of 155
schools and a control group made up of the remaining 361 schools.218 In Treatment I, girls in
grades 6-8 will receive Rs. 900 per quarter based on 80% attendance and girls in grades 9-10 will
receive Rs. 1200 per quarter based on 80% attendance.219 In Treatment II, girls in grades 6-8 will
receive Rs. 900 per quarter based on 80% attendance and girls in grade 9-10 will receive Rs.
2400 upon progression to this grade based on 80% attendance in the first quarter of the school
year and Rs. 1200 per quarter based on 80% attendance.220 The control group of girls in grades
6-10 will receive Rs. 600 per quarter based on 80% attendance, the same benefit structure as in
the original stipends program.221 The PESRP does not offer any explanation for why these
treatments were chosen, but explicitly stated that the goal was to retain girls in school.222
Treatment II, with its larger stipend amount provided on the first quarter of grades 9 and 10,
might be determine how larger incentives impact enrollment and incentive. More observations
about the effect of scaling up stipend amounts with age can be drawn once impact reports of
these pilot programs in Pakistan are released. After comparing the programs’ designs, Pakistan
might draw some lessons from Bangladesh’s program. Reconsidering whether literacy rates are
Department of School Education, Government of Punjab, Pakistan, “Distribution of Stipend to Girl Students,”
PESRP: Punjab Education Sector Reform Programme, http://www.pesrp.edu.pk/pages/Stipend-to-Girl.
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an efficient way of targeting populations and determining the impact of larger stipend amounts
might help the Punjab province’s FSS reach higher enrollment rates.
7

Conclusion
The conclusions of case studies support the view echoed in the literature that CCTs work in

very specific and narrow parameters to make small changes to specific human development
indicators. Both Bangladesh’s FSSP and Pakistan’s FSS increased secondary school enrolment
for female students and helped narrow the gender gap. It is possible that Bangladesh is simply an
impressive outlier in enrollment outcomes compared to other CCT programs in countries of
similar levels of income. Post-independence, Bangladesh has been influenced by an additional
group of political actors: donor-funded NGOs. The education of girls and the role of NGOs had a
marked impact on Bengali politics during the 1990s-2000s. Its program also had increasing
stipend amounts with grade level, unlike Pakistan’s program. The differences between the
education systems and budgets of the countries may have also had an impact. Pakistan’s
education system has struggled with more institutional instability, as well as more blatant and
militarized opposition to girls’ education. The rise of the garment industry in Bangladesh may
have had an impact on investments in girls’ education, but the relationship is not clear.
Bangladesh and Pakistan, for all their similarities, are different countries that face different
barriers to girls’ education. Pakistan’s FSSS may have made more modest progress in female
secondary school enrollment due to these programmatic, systemic, political, and economic
factors, but research was limited by availability of data. While this paper cannot definitively say
why Bangladesh was able to end to so rapidly end the gender gap, it was clear that conditions in
Bangladesh were more ideal for reducing the gender gap through a CCT program. By identifying
these possible factors, my research indicates several areas for further study, including
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recommendations for Pakistan’s program and the relationship between the garment industry and
demand for girls’ secondary education in Bangladesh. CCTs in parts of the world outside of
Latin America, particularly in South Asia, continue to be underrepresented in the literature.
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